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450 South State Street 
P.O. Box 140230 
Salt Lake City, Ut 84114-0230 
Re: State v. Burgess-Beynon, Case No. 20030454-CA 
Dear Paulette, 
This letter is offered pursuant to rule 24(i), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. At 
oral argument on August 16, 2004, defendant raised for the first time a claim that the 
"damaging a jail" statute was unconstitutionally vague and therefore violated defendant's 
right to notice. The State attaches the following cases relevant to defendant's claim: State 
v. Hobbs, 2003 UT App 27, ^ 33 n.5, 64 P.3d 1218 (refusing to reach claim raised for first 
time in reply brief); and State v. MacGuire, 2004 UT 4, % 12, 84 P.3d 1171 (holding that 
court will uphold facial vagueness challenge '"only if the [statute] is impermissibly vague 
in all of its applications," and "statute that is clear as applied to a particular complainant 
cannot be considered impermissibly vague in all of its applications") (citation omitted). 
Respectfully submitted, 
Karen A. Klucznik 
Assistant Attorney General 
encl. 
cc: D. Bruce Oliver, Attorney for Appellant (w/ encl.) 
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Court of Appeals ol • .... 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
•'• .
!
 .n :J • k' MOBBS, Defendant and Appellant 
I - u b •' . ' O i f J 
Following jury trial, defendant was convicted in the 
Seventh District Court, Moab Department, Lyle R. 
Anderson, J., of aggravated robbery and aggravated 
assault. Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Greenwood, J., held that: (1) claim of right defense 
is not available for the crime of robbery; (2) 
probative value of evidence did not outweigh 
considerations of time, confusion, delay, and 
relevance; (3) jury instruction adequately defined 
aggravated robbery; and (4) defendant's claim that 
robbery instruction erroneously excluded statutory 
language was not preserved for appeal 
Affirmed. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Criminal Law €=>! 134(3) 
11 Okl 134(3) Most Cited Cases 
Appellate court reviews trial court's determination 
concerning jury instructions for correctness and 
accords it no particular deference. 
: :•,>,;,aal Law €=>H34(3) 
4( 3) Most Cited Cases 
Appellate court reviews for correctness a trial 
court's statutory interpretation, accjrdmg it no 
particular deference. 
[3] Cr iminal Law €=^338(1) 
110k338(l) Most Cited Cases 
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:riminal Law €=>1153(1) 
1153(1) Most Cited Cases 
K M ! court has broad di _ • i IU determine 
whether proffered evidence - relevant, and 
appellate court will find error in a relevancy ruling 
only if the trial court has abused its discretion. 
* riminal Law € ^ 1 1 3 4 ( 3 ) 
« p n ^ Most n t e d Cases 
ner trial , >MI - p p\ ,n^::-ick:d tlie jury is a 
on of b- .laLc court reviews for 
'iness. 
[5] Robbery €=>14 
342k 14 Most Cited Cases 
There is no common law claim, of rights defense to 
the charge of robbery. 
[6] Statutes €=>188 
361kl88 Most Cited Cases 
In construing a statute, court must look first to the 
plain lanuiirn'r of the statute. 
[7] Statutes «^186 
361k W M-- '>>d'"-^es 
[7] Statutes €=>195 
361k i ^ Most Cited Cases 
In construing statute, each expit^Mun *u a iv-rm 
should be interpreted as the exclusion of anuiher, 
and, therefore, omissions in statutory language 
should be taken no*'* ^ r^nH <nven effect. 
[8] R
 t €^>14 
342k < Cited Cases 
Claim i' -e is not available for the w.....*. 
of robl^, In, . ,e the legislature specifically 
provided for the common law defense of claim -t" 
right only for theft charges; notwithstanding the ^ 1 
that theft is lesser included offense of robbery, the 
C p r . i. * 
64P.3d 1218 
64 P.3d 1218,466 Utah Adv. Rep. 13,2003 U T App 27 
(Cite as: 64 P.3d 1218) 
exclusion of claim of right defense within robbery 
statute is evidence of legislature's intent that it not 
be available for robbery. U.C.A.1953, 76-6-301, 
76-6-302,76-6-402(3). 
[9] Robbery €=>14 
342kl4 Most Cited Cases 
[9] Witnesses €=>374(1) 
410k374(l) Most Cited Cases 
Probative value of evidence offered by defendant in 
prosecution for aggravated robbery and aggravated 
assault of his employer, that employer owed 
defendant money and that employer had reputation 
for not timely paying his employees, to show 
employer's bias and lack of credibility, did not 
outweigh considerations of time, confusion, delay, 
and relevance, and thus was not admissible, as 
evidence was relevant only to defendant's claim of 
right defense, which was not defense allowed by 
robbery statute, and employer's bias was intended to 
be used to support defendant's claim of right 
defense. Rules of Evid., Rules 402, 403, 608(b). 
[10] Witnesses €=^372(1) 
410k372(l) Most Cited Cases 
A cross-examiner needs to be given wide latitude in 
exposing a witness' potential bias; however, this 
wide latitude in cross-examining for witness bias is 
limited by rule of evidence permitting exclusion of 
otherwise relevant evidence if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. 
Rules of Evid., Rules 403, 608(b). 
[11] Robbery €^27(2) 
342k27(2) Most Cited Cases 
In prosecution for aggravated robbery and 
aggravated assault, jury instruction adequately 
defined aggravated robbery, given that, even though 
instruction did not include a definition of robbery 
within it, robbery was defined in the next instruction. 
[12] Criminal Law €^822(1) 
110k822(l) Most Cited Cases 
Jury instructions must be evaluated as a whole to 
determine their adequacy. 
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[13] Criminal Law €==>822(1) 
110k822(l) Most Cited Cases 
Jury instructions will be affirmed when the 
instructions, taken as a whole, fairly tender the case 
to the jury even where one or more of the 
instructions, standing alone, are not as full or 
accurate as they might have been. 
[14] Criminal Law €==>1038.1(4) 
110kl038.1(4) Most Cited Cases 
Defendant's claim that robbery instruction 
erroneously omitted statutory language defining 
robbery was not preserved for appeal, as defendant 
did not object to error at trial and did not argue that 
exceptional circumstances existed or that plain error 
occurred. U.C.A.1953, 76-6-301(l)(b). 
[15] Criminal Law €=>1030(1) 
110k 1030(1) Most Cited Cases 
As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial 
court may not be raised on appeal; this is because 
trial court ought to be given an opportunity to 
address a claimed error and, if appropriate, correct 
it. 
[16] Criminal Law €=^1030(1) 
1 lOkl030(1) Most Cited Cases 
Preservation rule, that claims not raised before the 
trial court generally may not be raised on appeal, 
applies to every claim unless a defendant can 
demonstrate that exceptional circumstances exist or 
that plain error occurred. 
[17] Criminal Law €^1130(6) 
1 lOkl 130(6) Most Cited Cases 
Court of Appeals would not address defendant's 
argument that leaving elements of a crime out of a 
jury instruction may be plain error, as issue was not 
timely raised; issue was raised for first time in 
defendant's reply brief. 
*1219 Happy Morgan, Grand County Public 
Defender, Moab, for Appellant. 
Mark L. Shurtleff, Attorney General and Karen A. 
Klucznik, Assistant Attorney General, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellee. 
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Before Judges BILLINGS, BENCH, and 
GREENWOOD. 
OPINION 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
f 1 Richard Lyle Hobbs (Defendant) was 
convicted of aggravated robbery, a first degree 
felony, and aggravated assault, a third degree 
felony. Defendant appeals the trial court's rejection 
of his proposed jury instructions, defining his claim 
of right defense, rejection of evidence relating to his 
defense, and the trial court's aggravated robbery 
jury instruction. 
BACKGROUND 
If 2 "In setting out the facts from the record on 
appeal, we resolve all conflicts and doubts in favor 
of the jury's verdict and the rulings of the trial 
court." State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, 988 (Utah 
1989). On June 24, 2001, Mike Hughes (Hughes), 
owner of Adrift Adventures (Adrift), was working 
alone at the company headquarters in Moab, Utah. 
Defendant, an employee of Adrift, called Hughes to 
tell him that he would be coming over to discuss his 
paycheck. [FN1] 
FN1. The parties dispute whether 
Defendant also intended to pick up a gun 
that Hughes purportedly held for 
Defendant. 
\ 3 When Defendant arrived, Hughes and 
Defendant proceeded upstairs to discuss 
Defendant's payroll problems. While waiting for 
the account to come up on the computer, Hughes 
and Defendant started arguing about whether money 
was owed to Defendant and about an impending 
civil suit Defendant threatened to file against 
Hughes. Hughes testified that as he was turning 
toward Defendant to tell him he would look into the 
account, Defendant, pointing a gun at Hughes, told 
him, "you owe me money," and "things are over for 
you." Hughes testified that he believed he was 
going to die. 
Page 3 
*1220 If 4 Hughes then told Defendant that if they 
went downstairs he could have all the money in the 
till, approximately $2,000. Defendant followed 
Hughes downstairs. As they neared the bottom of 
the stairs Hughes threw papers up in the air and 
fled, running down the street yelling, "He's got a 
gun." One witness, Officer Green, testified that he 
saw Defendant chasing Hughes with a gun in his 
hand and turned his vehicle around to assess the 
situation. Another witness, Alex Crosby (Crosby), 
also testified that he saw Defendant with a gun in 
his hand, chasing Hughes. 
Tf 5 As Hughes was running down the street, he 
flagged down a patrol car, driven by Officer Reger. 
Officer Reger exited the vehicle. Hughes jumped 
into the patrol car and drove about half a block 
before stopping and exiting the vehicle. Officer 
Reger testified that when Hughes jumped into his 
patrol car, Defendant turned and walked away, 
holding something in his hand. 
^ 6 Hughes testified that Defendant was still 
running toward him with a gun when he exited the 
patrol car. Crosby testified that he saw Defendant 
chase Hughes after he exited the patrol car. After 
exiting the patrol car Hughes saw two of his 
employees, screamed, "[Defendant] is trying to kill 
me," and dove into their vehicle. The two 
employees testified that they saw Defendant holding 
a gun above his head at the time Hughes jumped 
into their vehicle. The gun was never fired nor was 
any money taken from Adrift. 
f 7 At this point, Officer Green approached the 
scene and saw Officer Reger, who was dressed in 
plain clothes, holding a gun. Officer Green 
approached Officer Reger with his gun drawn. 
After a short stand off, Officer Reger identified 
himself, and the two officers proceeded to look for 
Defendant. Defendant claimed that after he saw the 
officers in a stand off, with guns drawn, he left the 
scene for his own safety. 
f 8 A witness saw Defendant toss something into 
some bushes where officers found a magazine clip 
with a bullet in it, as well as an unspent shell. 
Several hours later, Defendant turned himself into 
the police. Although not giving his correct name, 
Defendant stated: "Here I am, I did it." 
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
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If 9 Prior to trial, Defendant filed proposed jury 
instructions that included instructions on a claim of 
right defense based on his "bona fide impression 
and honest belief that the money he was seeking 
was his own." At trial, the court rejected 
Defendant's proposed instructions and prohibited 
evidence related to his claim of right defense. 
Defendant was found guilty of aggravated robbery 
and aggravated assault. Defendant appeals his 
conviction of aggravated robbery. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
[1][2] If 10 Defendant first argues the trial court 
erred in rejecting his proposed jury instructions 
relating to his claim of right defense. "[W]e review 
the trial court's determination concerning jury 
instructions for correctness and accord it no 
particular deference." State v. Jones, 878 P.2d 
1175, 1176 (Utah Ct.App.1994). Additionally, 
"[w]e review for correctness a trial court's statutory 
interpretation, according it no particular deference." 
State v. Barrick 2002 UT App I20,1f 4, 46 P.3d 
770 (quotations and citations omitted). 
[3] 1f 11 Defendant next argues the trial court 
erred in not permitting evidence of Defendant's 
claim of right defense by excluding evidence that 
the victim, Hughes, had a reputation for dishonesty, 
and had a practice of underpaying employees. "[A] 
trial court has broad discretion to determine 
whether proffered evidence is relevant, and we will 
find error in a relevancy ruling only if the trial court 
has abused its discretion." State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 
35,H 17, 999 P.2d 7 (quotations and citation 
omitted). 
[4] % 12 Finally, Defendant argues the trial court 
inadequately instructed the jury on aggravated 
robbery and robbery. Whether the trial court 
properly instructed the jury is a question of law, 
which this court reviews for correctness. See State 
v. Stringham, 2001 UT App 13,111, 17 P.3d 1153. 
*1221 ANALYSIS 
I. Proposed Jury Instructions Relating to Claim of 
Right Defense 
\ 13 Defendant was convicted of aggravated 
robbery under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302(1) 
(1999), which states: "A person commits 
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aggravated robbery if in the course of committing 
robbery, he: (a) uses or threatens to use a 
dangerous weapon...." (Emphasis added.) Robbery 
is committed when: 
(a) the person unlawfully and intentionally takes 
or attempts to take personal property in the 
possession of another from his person, or 
immediate presence, against his will, by means of 
force or fear; or 
(b) the person intentionally or knowingly uses 
force or fear of immediate force against another 
in the course of committing a theft. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301(1) (1999). 
Defendant argues that he is entitled to assert a claim 
of right defense by virtue of (1) the case of People 
v. Hughes, 11 Utah 100, 39 P. 492, 494 (1895) 
(permitting claim of right defense where defendant 
had an honest belief in his entitlement to property); 
and (2) the robbery statute, which incorporates the 
defenses in the theft statute. 
A. Viability of People v. Hughes 
| 14 In Hughes, the defendant was found guilty of 
robbery when he used a gun to take money from 
fellow gamblers. See Hughes, 39 P. at 492. The 
defendant's theory was that he took the money 
under a "claim of ownership, and an honest belief 
that [he] had a right to the money." Id. The trial 
court, however, rejected a jury instruction defining 
the claim of right defense and instead instructed the 
jury that it was immaterial whose money was taken 
by the defendant. See id. at 494. On appeal, the 
supreme court reversed, stating: 
[It] was material, and the burden of proof was on 
the prosecution to prove the money was owned by 
some person other than the defendant, for, if the 
money belonged to him, and it was wrongfully in 
the possession of another, he would not be guilty 
of robbery, as the animus furandi [felonious 
intent] would be wanting. 
Id. 
[5] \ 15 Defendant argues that Hughes has never 
been overruled and is binding precedent. Thus, the 
trial court erred in not permitting instructions 
relating to the claim of right defense. The trial 
court held that the claim of right defense described 
in Hughes was superseded by 1973 changes to the 
Utah Code. We agree. First, Utah Code Ann. § 
76-1-105 (1999), enacted in 1973, abolished 
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
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common law crimes such as robbery. Second, the 
claim of right defense was superseded by Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-1-103 (1999), also enacted in 1973, 
which states, "[t]he provisions of this code shall 
govern the construction of, the punishment for, and 
defenses against any offense defined in this code...." 
(Emphasis added.) Because section 76-1-103 
states that the criminal code governs all defenses, 
the claim of right defense for robbery is not 
available if it is not specifically designated as a 
defense in the criminal code. 
f 16 Our reasoning is supported by State v. 
Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568 (Utah 1991). In Gardiner, 
the defendant argued that he had a right to resist 
arrest under the common law. See id at 569. 
After detailed analysis of the common law, the court 
determined that it was "not free to fashion" a rule 
respecting the common law theories of resisting 
arrest because the legislature had already acted. Id. 
at 573. The court reasoned that where the 
legislature enacted a number of specific and general 
defenses, the failure to enact a general illegal arrest 
defense "preclude[d] [the court] from finding any 
generally available common law right.... If such a 
defense exists in Utah, it must be grounded in the 
specific code sections under which [the defendant] 
was convicted." Id. at 574. 
% 17 The case of State v. Durant, 674 P.2d 638 
(Utah 1983), provides additional support. In 
Durant, the defendant was charged with aggravated 
arson for burning a "habitable structure." Id. at 639. 
The defendant argued that at common law it was 
legal to burn one's own dwelling; therefore, where 
he received permission from the owner-himself-to 
burn the dwelling, he could not be guilty *1222 of 
aggravated arson. See id. Specifically, the 
defendant argued that the term "unlawfully" in the 
arson statute maintained the common law arson 
definition, which included malicious burning but 
excluded the burning of one's own dwelling by 
requiring the burned property to be that "of 
another." Id. at 640. 
If 18 The court determined that the legislature's 
omission of "property of another" and inclusion of 
"habitable structure" in the revision of the arson 
statute was purposeful and evidence of a shifting 
emphasis on protecting human life. Id. at 641. The 
court held that the legislature's use of the terms 
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"unlawfully" and "intentionally," changed the mens 
rea of arson to "require that the burning be other 
than accidental or careless and that the damage be 
without justification and contrary to safety 
precautions." [FN2] Id. at 645. The court stated, 
" 'It is the power and responsibility of the 
Legislature to enact laws to promote the public 
health, safety, morals and general welfare of 
society, and this Court will not substitute our 
judgment for that of the Legislature with regard to 
what best serves the public interest.' " Id. at 642 
(quoting Bastion v. King, 661 P.2d 953, 956 (Utah 
1983)). 
FN2. Similar to State v. Durant, 674 P.2d 
638 (Utah 1983), our legislature has 
changed the mens rea to "unlawfully and 
intentionally" when defining robbery as the 
attempt to take or taking of property by 
means of force or fear. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-301(1) (1999). There is no 
qualification in this definition that permits 
the taking of property, even if owned by 
the taker, if doing so involves force. This 
definition is unambiguous, thus reflecting 
the legislature's intent to do what "best 
serves the public interest" by making it 
illegal to use force to recover any property. 
Durant, 674 P.2d at 642. 
\ 19 Consequently, we conclude that Hughes has 
been superseded by the 1973 amendments to the 
criminal code which does not require consideration 
of the common law claim of right defense. 
B. Robbery Statute 
\ 20 Defendant next argues that even if Hughes 
was superseded by Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-105, the 
claim of right defense still exists because theft, 
requiring the taking of another's property, is a lesser 
included offense of robbery. Therefore, according 
to Defendant, the statutory defenses to theft are 
necessarily included as defenses to robbery. We 
disagree. 
[6] [7] t 21 The court must "look first to the plain 
language of the statute." Stephens v. Bonneville 
Travel, Inc., 935 P.2d 518, 520 (Utah 1997). Each 
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
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expression of a term "should be interpreted as the 
exclusion of another. Therefore, omissions in 
statutory language should 'be taken note of and 
given effect.' " Biddle v. Washington Terrace City, 
1999 UT 110,1[ 14, 993 P.2d 875 (quoting 
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Anderson, 30 Utah 2d 
102, 105, 514 P.2d 217, 219 (1973)); see also In re 
A.B., 936 P.2d 1091, 1098 (Utah Ct.App.1997) 
(giving force to legislature's choice to exclude 
rehabilitation from consideration under serious 
youth offender act where legislature's inclusion in 
other sections of code indicates legislature knew 
how to include such factor). 
[8] If 22 The claim of right defense is clearly 
available for the crime of theft: 
It is a defense under this part that the actor: 
(a) Acted under an honest claim of right to the 
property or service involved; or 
(b) Acted in the honest belief that he had the right 
to obtain or exercise control over the property or 
service as he did; or 
(c) Obtained or exercised control over the 
property or service honestly believing that the 
owner, if present, would have consented. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402(3) (1999). However, 
the claim of right defense is not specified as an 
available defense for robbery or aggravated 
robbery. See id. §§ 76-6-301 to -302. Where the 
legislature was obviously aware of the availability 
of the claim of right defense, having included it 
within the definition of theft, we assume the 
legislature would have included it within the 
robbery statute had the legislature intended to do so. 
f 23 Many other jurisdictions have addressed this 
issue and determined that although the claim of 
right defense may be statutorily available for theft 
offenses, it is *1223 not available for robbery or 
burglary offenses. For example, the Iowa Court of 
Appeals, considering an appeal of a burglary 
conviction, analyzed their robbery and burglary 
statutes to determine whether the claim of right 
defense was available for those crimes. See State 
v. Miller, 622 N.W.2d 782, 785 (Iowa Ct.App.2000) 
. The court determined that although Iowa's claim 
of right defense statute expressly states its 
availability for a person "guilty of theft," defendants 
accused of robbery and burglary were not permitted 
to use the defense. Id. The Miller court stated that 
to permit another interpretation "would require us to 
Page 6 
read something into the law that is not apparent 
from the words chosen by the legislature." Id The 
court went on to analyze the "modern trend ... to 
decline to recognize the claim-of-right defense to 
offenses involving force, such as robbery or 
burglary." Id; see also People v. Tufunga, 21 
Cal.4th 935, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 143, 987 P.2d 168, 
177-78 (1999) (outlining modern trend). The 
reasons for this conclusion are well-stated in State 
v. Ortiz, 124 N.J.Super. 189, 305 A.2d 800 (1973), 
where the court found the proposition that a claim 
of right negates the felonious intent of robbery lacks 
logic and "is utterly incompatible with and has no 
place in an ordered and orderly society such as ours, 
which eschews self-help through violence. 
Adoption of the proposition would be but one step 
short of accepting lawless reprisal as an appropriate 
means of redressing grievances, real or fancied." 
[FN3] Id at 802 (footnote omitted). 
FN3. Other cases holding that a claim of 
right defense is not available in robbery 
cases include the following: Whitescarver 
v. State, 962 P.2d 192, 195 (Alaska 
Ct.App.1998); State v. Schaefer, 163 Ariz. 
626, 790 P.2d 281, 284 (Ariz.Ct.App.1990) 
; Thomas v. State, 584 So.2d 1022, 1026 
(Fla.Dist.Ct. App. 1991); Westmoreland v. 
State, 245 Ga.App. 482, 538 S.E.2d 119, 
121 (2000); Crowder v. State, 241 
Ga.App. 818, 527 S.E.2d 901, 904 (2000); 
Hamby v. State, 206 Ga.App. 791, 426 
S.E.2d" 670, 671-72 (1992); State v. 
Brighter, 62 Haw. 25, 608 P.2d 855, 859 
(1980); Cates v. State, 21 Md.App. 363, 
320 A.2d 75, 82 (1974); People v. Reid, 
69 N.Y.2d 469, 515 N.Y.S.2d 750, 508 
N.E.2d 661, 665 (1987); People v. 
Hodges, 113 A.D.2d 514, 496 N.Y.S.2d 
771, 774 (N.Y.App.Div.1985); In re 
Hammer, 139 Misc.2d 782, 528 N.Y.S.2d 
784, 785 (N.Y.Fam.Ct.1988); 
Commonwealth v. Sleighter, 495 Pa. 262, 
433 A.2d 469, 471 (1981); 
Commonwealth v. Dombrauskas, 274 
Pa.Super. 452, 418 A.2d 493, 497 (1980); 
State v. Self, 42 Wash.App. 654, 713 P.2d 
142, 144 (1986); cf. Ala.Code § 
13A-8-44 (1994); State v. Messier, 16 
Conn.App. 455, 549 A.2d 270, 274 (1988). 
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
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1f 24 We therefore hold that the claim of right 
defense is not available for the crime of robbery 
because the legislature specifically provided for the 
common law defense of claim of right only for theft 
charges. The exclusion of the defense for robbery 
charges is evidence of the legislature's intent that it 
not be available for robbery. Consequently, the 
trial court correctly refused to instruct the jury on 
the claim of right defense. 
II. Evidence of the Victim's Bias & Dishonesty 
Tf 25 Defendant argues that the trial court erred in 
not permitting greater inquiry into Hughes's 
reputation for dishonesty. [FN4] Defendant argues 
that evidence of Hughes's dishonesty and business 
practices would have been used by Defendant to 
show Hughes's bias and lack of credibility. 
FN4. Defendant was permitted to present 
evidence of Hughes's character trait for 
dishonesty through two witnesses who 
both stated that Hughes had a reputation 
for dishonesty in the community. 
*[[ 26 "[A] trial court has broad discretion to 
determine whether proffered evidence is relevant, 
and [this court] will find error in a relevancy ruling 
only if the trial court has abused its discretion." 
State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35,^ 17, 999 P.2d 7 
(quotation and citations omitted). Defendant 
argues that the ability to produce evidence 
supporting his defense is a constitutional right 
guaranteed by the Utah Const, art. I, § 12 ("In 
criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the 
right to appear and defend...."). Accord Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-l-6(l)(a) (1999). However, although 
Defendant cites State v. Harding, 635 P.2d 33 
(Utah 1981) to support his claim, he fails to 
acknowledge the court's statement that if "there is 
no reasonable basis in the evidence to support the 
defense or its essential components, it is not error 
for the trial judge to either refuse to instruct the jury 
as to the defense, or to instruct them to disregard 
it" Id. at 34. Defendant sought to *1224 
introduce evidence to prove that Hughes owed him 
money and had a reputation for not timely paying 
his employees. The evidence was relevant only to 
his claim of right defense. Defendant's claim of 
right defense was rejected by the trial court, and we 
Page 7 
have concluded above that the defense is not 
available to Defendant. Therefore, it was not error 
for the trial judge to exclude evidence relating to a 
defense that is no longer available. See id; see 
also Utah R. Evid. 402 ("Evidence which is not 
relevant is not admissible."); State v. Jaeger, 1999 
UT l,1f 13, 973 P.2d 404 ("[W]here the proffered 
evidence has no probative value to a fact at issue, it 
is irrelevant and is inadmissible under rule 402."). 
[9] [10] Tf 27 Defendant also argues that rule 
608(c) of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides him 
with unfettered discretion to present evidence of a 
victim's bias. Rule 608(c) states, "Bias, prejudice 
or any motive to misrepresent may be shown to 
impeach the witness either by examination of the 
witness or by evidence otherwise adduced." It has 
long been recognized that a cross-examiner needs to 
be given "wide latitude in exposing a witness' 
potential bias." State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200, 
203 (Utah 1987); State v. Maestas, 564 P.2d 1386, 
1388 (Utah 1977). However, this "wide latitude" 
in cross-examining for witness bias is "limited by 
Utah Rule of Evidence 403." Hackford, 137 P.2d at 
203. Rule 403 permits the exclusion of otherwise 
relevant evidence "if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence." Utah R, Evid. 403; see also Hackford, 
737P.2dat203. 
K 28 The trial court stated that although the 
grievances of other employees 
may all tend to show a special sensitivity on Mr. 
Hughes' part ... it does so at the cost of a 
considerable amount of time, introducing the 
potential for confusion of the issues, delay, and I 
just don't think it's worth-and some possible 
prejudice, I guess, to Mr. Hughes that he ends up 
being put on trial when he's the alleged victim in 
this case and he isn't in control of the prosecution. 
Where considerations of time, confusion, and 
delay were enumerated by the trial court, Defendant 
has not shown that the trial court abused its 
discretion in determining that the probative value of 
Hughes's bias, which was to be used to support 
Defendant's rejected claim of right defense, was 
substantially outweighed by considerations 
permitted by rule 403. 
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III. Adequacy of Jury Instructions 
1f 29 The Defendant claims that the aggravated 
robbery instruction and robbery instruction were 
incorrect, requiring reversal of his robbery 
conviction. 
% 30 The relevant instructions state: 
Instruction No. 3 
In order to obtain a conviction, the state must 
prove each element of the offense beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Those elements are as 
follows: 
COUNT I: AGGRAVATED ROBBERY 
1. That on or about June 29, 2001, defendant, 
while in the course of committing robbery, 
2. Did use a dangerous weapon, 
3. Knowingly and intentionally. 
Instruction No. 4 
Robbery is the unlawful and intentional taking or 
attempted taking of personal property from 
another, from his person or in his immediate 
presence, by means offeree or fear. 
Personal property means anything of value other 
than land. I can not [sic] assert a defense to a 
charge of robbery that I believe that the other 
person owes me money. 
[11][12][13] f 31 Defendant first finds error with 
Instruction 3, arguing that the trial court did not 
clearly define aggravated robbery because the 
instruction did not include a definition of robbery 
within it. However, "[j]ury instructions must be 
evaluated as a whole to determine their adequacy." 
State v. Garcia, 2001 UT App 19,Tf 13, 18 P.3d 
1123. *1225 Jury instructions will be affirmed 
"when the instructions, taken as a whole, fairly 
tender the case to the jury [even where] one or more 
of the instructions, standing alone, are not as full or 
accurate as they might have been." Id. (quotations 
and citations omitted) (alteration in original). Here, 
the trial court defined robbery in the next 
instruction. Read as a whole the instructions 
adequately defined robbery. 
[14] If 32 Defendant also finds error with 
Instruction 4, because the trial court omitted 
subsection 76-6-301(1 )(b), which states that 
robbery can also be committed if "the person 
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intentionally or knowingly uses force or fear of 
immediate force against another in the course of 
committing a theft." Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-301(1 )(b). Defendant argues that the trial court 
erred in not including this second definition of 
robbery within the instruction. 
[15][16][17] % 33 Defendant's argument fails 
because it was not preserved for appeal. Defendant 
did not object to Instruction 4. "As a general rule, 
claims not raised before the trial court may not be 
raised on appeal." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,Tf 
11, 10 P.3d 346. This is because the " 'trial court 
ought to be given an opportunity to address a 
claimed error and, if appropriate, correct it.1 " Id. 
(quoting State v Eldredge, 713 P.2d 29, 36 (Utah 
1989)). The "preservation rule applies to every 
claim ... unless a defendant can demonstrate that 
'exceptional circumstances' exist or 'plain error' 
occurred." Id. (citations omitted). Defendant has 
not argued plain error [FN5] or exceptional 
circumstances on appeal. We therefore do not 
address the argument further. 
FN5. Defendant raises for the first time in 
his reply brief the argument that leaving 
elements of a crime out of a jury 
instruction may be plain error. Because 
this issue was not timely raised, we do not 
address it. See Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT 
89,1[ 23, 16 P.3d 540 ("Generally, issues 
raised by an appellant in the reply brief 
that were not presented in the opening 
brief are considered waived and will not be 
considered by the appellate court."). 
CONCLUSION 
If 34 In conclusion, we hold that the claim of right 
defense is not available for the crime of robbery 
because (1) the defense has been superseded by 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-1-103 and -105, and (2) the 
exclusion of the defense in the definition of robbery 
and the inclusion of the defense for the crime of 
theft is evidence of the legislature's intent that the 
claim of right defense is not available for robbery. 
1f 35 Additionally, we hold that the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in rejecting additional 
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evidence of Hughes's bias because the claim of right 
defense is unavailable for robbery and because the 
court prohibited the evidence properly under rule 
403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
| 36 Finally, we hold that the trial court properly 
instructed the jury as to the definitions of robbery 
and aggravated robbery, because, read as a whole, 
the instructions were complete. Also, Defendant 
did not properly preserve the issue of whether the 
trial court erred in not including section 76-6-
301(l)(b) in Instruction 4. Thus, we affirm. 
If 37 WE CONCUR: JUDITH M. BILLINGS, 
Associate Presiding Judge and RUSSELL W. 
BENCH, Judge. 
64 P.3d 1218, 466 Utah Adv. Rep. 13, 2003 UT 
App 27 
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Supreme Court of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Roger Martin MacGUIRE, Defendant and 
Petitioner. 
No. 20020071. 
Jan. 23, 2004. 
Background: Defendant was charged with two 
counts of aggravated murder for allegedly killing 
his former wife and her unborn child. Defendant 
filed motion to dismiss Count I in part and Count II 
in its entirety, arguing that he could not be 
prosecuted for killing the unborn child or be 
charged with aggravated murder based on that 
killing, because the criminal homicide and 
aggravated murder statutes are unconstitutional. 
The District Court, Davis County, Michael G. 
Allphin, J., denied motion. Defendant petitioned for 
review of this interlocutory order. 
Holding: Upon grant of petition, the Supreme 
Court, Durrant, Associate Chief Justice, held that: 
term "unborn child" did not render criminal 
homicide and aggravated murder statutes 
unconstitutionally vague in violation of due 
process, either facially, or as applied. 
Affirmed. 
Parrish, J., filed concurring opinion, in which 
Durrant, Associate Chief Justice, Wilkins, and 
Nehring, JJ., joined. 
Durham, C.J., filed dissenting opinion. 
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[1] Criminal Law €=^1134(3) 
110k! 134(3) Most Cited Cases 
Whether the trial court properly interpreted a statute 
is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. 
[2] Criminal Law €==>1134(3) 
1 lOkl 134(3) Most Cited Cases 
Whether a statute is constitutional is a question of 
law that is reviewed for correctness, with the 
reviewing court giving no deference to the trial 
court. 
[3] Constitutional Law €==>48(1) 
92k48(l) Most Cited Cases 
Legislative enactments are presumed to be 
constitutional. 
[4] Constitutional Law €=>48(1) 
92k48(l) Most Cited Cases 
Those who challenge a statute as unconstitutional 
bear a heavy burden of demonstrating its 
unconstitutionality. 
[5] Constitutional Law €=>258(3.1) 
92k258(3.1) Most Cited Cases 
[5] Homicide €=^523 
203k523 Most Cited Cases 
Term "unborn child" did not render criminal 
homicide and aggravated murder statutes 
unconstitutionally vague in violation of due 
process, either facially, or as applied; term clearly 
encompassed a human being at any stage of 
development in utero, and thus statutes provided 
adequate notice to ordinary person about what 
conduct was proscribed, and, because meaning of 
term was readily ascertainable, its inclusion did not 
encourage or facilitate arbitrary or discriminatory 
enforcement. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14; 
U.C.A.1953, 76- 5-202(l)(b); U.C.A.1953, 
76-5-201(1) (1999). 
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[6] Constitutional Law €=>48(4.1) 
92k48(4.1) Most Cited Cases 
Where a statute implicates no constitutionally 
protected conduct, a court will uphold a facial 
vagueness challenge only if the statute is 
impermissibly vague in all of its applications. 
[7] Criminal Law €=>13.1(1) 
110kl3.1(l) Most Cited Cases 
A statute that is clear as applied to a particular 
complainant cannot be considered impermissibly 
vague in all of its applications and thus will 
necessarily survive a facial vagueness challenge. 
[8] Criminal Law €^13.1(1) 
110kl3.1(l) Most Cited Cases 
To establish that the complained-of statutory 
provisions are impermissibly vague, a defendant 
must demonstrate either (1) that the statutes do not 
provide the kind of notice that enables ordinary 
people to understand what conduct is prohibited, or 
(2) that the statutes encourage arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement. 
[9] Constitutional Law €==>251.4 
92k251.4 Most Cited Cases 
Vagueness questions are essentially procedural due 
process issues, i.e., whether the statute adequately 
notices the proscribed conduct. U.S.C.A. 
Const. Amend. 14. 
[10] Criminal Law €=>13.1(1) 
110kl3.1(1) Most Cited Cases 
If a statute is sufficiently explicit to inform the 
ordinary reader what conduct is prohibited, it is not 
unconstitutionally vague. 
[11] Statutes €==>188 
361kl88 Most Cited Cases 
In considering the meaning of a statutory provision, 
the analysis begins with the plain language of the 
provision. 
[12] Statutes €^188 
361kl88 Most Cited Cases 
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In interpreting a statute, the court need not look 
beyond the plain language unless it finds some 
ambiguity in it. 
[13] Statutes €=»205 
361k205 Most Cited Cases 
[13] Statutes €=>208 
361k208 Most Cited Cases 
[13] Statutes €=>223.2(.5) 
361k223.2(.5) Most Cited Cases 
The plain language of a statute is to be read as a 
whole, and its provisions interpreted in harmony 
with other provisions in the same statute and with 
other statutes under the same and related chapters. 
[14] Criminal Law €^13.1(1) 
110kl3.1(l) Most Cited Cases 
In addition to providing adequate notice about what 
conduct is proscribed, the "void for vagueness" 
doctrine requires the legislature to define the 
criminal offense in a manner that does not 
encourage Eirbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement; in other words, the legislature must 
establish minimal guidelines to govern law 
enforcement. 
[15] Criminal Law €=>13.1(1) 
110kl3.1(l) Most Cited Cases 
The "void for vagueness" doctrine does not require 
a legislature to define statutory terms that are 
readily ascertainable. 
[16] Criminal Law €=>1072 
110kl072 Most Cited Cases 
Supreme Court declined to address on appeal issue 
of whether criminal homicide and aggravated 
murder statutes violated equal protection; defendant 
failed to petition for interlocutory review of issue, 
Supreme Court, thus, did not grant defendant 
permission to appeal this issue, and, because 
petition made no reference to equal protection 
argument or provided concise analysis of legal 
authority, the state was denied opportunity to 
respond to issue. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14; 
Const. Art. 1, § 24; Rules App.Proc, Rule 5(a), 
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*1172 Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., J. Frederic 
Voros, Jr., Christopher D. Ballard, Asst. Att'ys 
Gen., William K. McGuire, Davis County Att'y, 
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff. 
Scott L. Wiggins, Salt Lake City, for defendant. 
DURRANT, Associate Chief Justice: 
INTRODUCTION 
f^ 1 Utah's criminal homicide statute provides that 
a person may be prosecuted for causing the death of 
an unborn child. This interlocutory appeal concerns 
(1) whether the term "unborn child" is 
unconstitutionally vague both on its face and as 
applied, and (2) whether the criminal homicide and 
aggravated murder statutes violate the federal and 
state guarantees of equal protection. 
f 2 Defendant Roger Martin MacGuire has been 
charged with two counts of aggravated murder for 
allegedly killing his former wife and her unborn 
child. In a motion to dismiss Count I in part and 
Count II in its entirety, defendant contended he 
could not be prosecuted for killing the unborn child 
or be charged with aggravated murder based on that 
killing because Utah's criminal homicide and 
aggravated murder statutes are unconstitutional. 
The district court denied defendant's motion to 
dismiss and defendant petitioned *1173 for review 
of the interlocutory order. We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
f 3 Defendant has been charged with the murder 
of his former wife, Susan C. MacGuire, and her 
unborn child. According to accounts presented at 
the preliminary hearing, [FN1] defendant learned, 
several days prior to the murder, that Ms. MacGuire 
was engaged and expecting a baby. He called his 
former father-in-law on January 14, 2001, to 
confirm the information. On the morning of 
January 15, 2001, defendant allegedly entered the 
insurance office where Ms. MacGuire worked and 
shot her four times. 
Page 3 
FN1. The facts included in this section 
have not been established at trial but 
remain mere allegations. 
% 4 One of the bullets entered Ms. MacGuire at 
the base of her neck and traveled through the 
occipital bone of the skull. A second bullet entered 
and exited her left forearm. A third bullet entered 
the side of her abdomen approximately at the 
waistline and pierced her abdominal wall and small 
intestine. A fourth bullet entered her abdomen and 
traveled through her uterus, lodging in the right wall 
of her pelvis. [FN2] 
FN2. Although the medical examiner did 
not specify the exact order of the gunshot 
wounds, she did testify that the gunshot 
wounds to the abdomen likely occurred 
prior to the gunshot wound to the head. 
She had no opinion as to when the gunshot 
wound to the arm occurred. 
If 5 This fourth bullet lethally injured the unborn 
child Ms. MacGuire was carrying. It severed the 
umbilical cord and traveled through the placenta 
and unborn child itself before lodging in the pelvic 
wall. The medical examiner estimated that the 
gestational age of the unborn child was between 
thirteen and fifteen weeks at the time of death. Ms. 
MacGuire was life-flighted to a hospital where she 
died later that day. 
f 6 Defendant has been charged with two counts 
of aggravated murder. Count I of the information 
charges defendant with aggravated murder for the 
death of Ms. MacGuire and alleges two aggravating 
circumstances; namely, (1) two persons were killed 
during the same criminal episode, and (2) the 
homicide was committed to retaliate against or 
prevent Ms. MacGuire from testifying, providing 
evidence, or participating in a legal proceeding or 
official investigation. [FN3] Count II of the 
information charges defendant with aggravated 
murder for the death of the unborn child during a 
criminal episode in which two persons were killed. 
FN3. The second aggravating factor is 
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based upon the allegation that when 
defendant arrived at Ms. MacGuire's 
workplace just prior to the murder, Ms. 
MacGuire threatened to call the police and 
report defendant for violating a protective 
order that was in place at the time. 
Tf 7 Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the first 
aggravating factor in Count I and to dismiss Count 
II in its entirety on the basis that an unborn child is 
not a person under the aggravated murder statute, 
and the criminal homicide and aggravated murder 
statutes are unconstitutionally vague and violate 
equal protection guarantees. The district court 
denied defendant's motion, and defendant filed a 
petition for interlocutory appeal. We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. section 
78-2-2(3 )(h) (2002). 
ANALYSIS 
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1][2][3][4] 1f 8 Whether the district court 
properly interpreted Utah's criminal homicide and 
aggravated murder statutes "is a question of law that 
we review for correctness." State v. Gomez, 2002 
UT 120, \ 11, 63 P.3d 72. Likewise, "[w]hether a 
statute is constitutional is a question of law [that] 
we review for correctness, giving no deference to 
the trial court." State v. Daniels, 2002 UT 2, If 30, 
40 P.3d 611 (citing State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991, 
995 (Utah 1995)). Moreover, "legislative 
enactments are presumed to be constitutional." 
Greenwood v. City of North Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 
816, 819 (Utah 1991) (citations omitted). As a 
result, "those who challenge a statute ... as 
unconstitutional bear" a heavy "burden of 
demonstrating its unconstitutionality." Id. (citations 
omitted); accord Mohi, 901 P.2d at 1009 (Russon, 
J., concurring and dissenting) (stating the burden of 
"challenging the constitutionality of a *1174 
statute" is "a heavy one"); United States v. Nat'l 
Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32, 83 S.Ct. 594, 
9 L.Ed.2d 561 (1963) (noting that a "strong 
presumptive validity" attaches to legislative acts). 
II. VAGUENESS CHALLENGE 
[5] f 9 Defendant challenges the criminal 
homicide and aggravated murder statutes of the 
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim 
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Utah Code as being unconstitutionally vague both 
facially and as applied. The criminal homicide 
statute provides as follows: 
(a) A person commits criminal homicide if he 
intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, with criminal 
negligence, or acting with a mental state 
otherwise specified in the statute defining the 
offense, causes the death of another human 
being, including an unborn child 
(b) There shall be no cause of action for criminal 
homicide for the death of an unborn child caused 
by an abortion. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-201(1) (1999) (emphasis 
added). 
\ 10 The aggravated murder statute provides, in 
relevant part, as follows: 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes aggravated 
murder if the actor intentionally or knowingly 
causes the death of another under any of the 
following circumstances: 
(b) the homicide was committed incident to one 
act, scheme, course of conduct, or criminal 
episode during which two or more persons were 
killed.... 
Id. § 76-5-202(l)(b) (emphasis added). 
f 11 Defendant contends the term "unborn child" 
in the criminal homicide statute is unconstitutionally 
vague because the legislature failed to define the 
term and, absent that definition, it lacks a clear and 
specific meaning. Moreover, because "unborn 
child" is not defined, defendant contends the terms 
"another" and "persons" in the aggravated murder 
statute are also unconstitutionally vague because it 
is impossible to know when an unborn child 
achieves the status of a person. We disagree. 
A. Void for Vagueness Doctrine 
[6][7] f 12 Where, as here, a statute "implicates 
no constitutionally protected conduct," a court will 
uphold a facial vagueness challenge "only if the 
[statute] is impermissibly vague in all of its 
applications." Village of Hoffman Estates v. The 
Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494-
95, 102 S.Ct 1186, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982). A 
statute that is clear as applied to a particular 
complainant cannot be considered impermissibly 
vague in all of its applications and thus will 
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necessarily survive a facial vagueness challenge. 
See id. at 495, 102 S.Ct. 1186 ("A plaintiff who 
engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed 
cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as 
applied to the conduct of others."). 
[8] \ 13 In order to establish that the 
complained-of provisions are impermissibly vague, 
a defendant must demonstrate either (1) that the 
statutes do not provide "the kind of notice that 
enables ordinary people to understand what conduct 
[is prohibited]," or (2) that the statutes "encourage 
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." State v. 
Honie, 2002 UT 4, f 31, 57 P.3d 977 (citing 
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357, 103 S.Ct. 
1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983)). Defendant has 
failed to establish that the statutes violate either test. 
B. Notice that Conduct Is Prohibited 
[9] [10] H 14 "Vagueness questions are essentially 
procedural due process issues, i.e., whether the 
statute adequately notices the proscribed conduct." 
State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183, 191-92 (Utah 
1987) (citation omitted). If a statute " 'is 
sufficiently explicit to inform the ordinary reader 
what conduct is prohibited,' " it is not 
unconstitutionally vague. Id. (quoting State v. 
Theobald, 645 P.2d 50, 51 (Utah 1982)). Here, 
defendant contends that the criminal homicide and 
aggravated murder statutes do not provide adequate 
notice about what type of conduct is prohibited 
because an ordinary person is left to guess at the 
meaning of the term "unborn child." Thus, 
defendant reasons, a person cannot " 'steer between 
lawful and unlawful conduct.' " Village of Hoffman 
Estates, 455 U.S. at 498, 102 S.Ct. 1186 (quoting 
*\\15Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 
108-09, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972)). 
We therefore must determine whether the term 
"unborn child" is sufficiently definite to provide 
adequate notice as to what conduct is proscribed. 
1. Plain Meaning of "Unborn Child" 
[11][12][13] 1f 15 "In considering the meaning of 
a [statutory] provision, the analysis begins with the 
plain language of the provision.... We need not look 
beyond the plain language unless we find some 
ambiguity in it." Utah Sch. Bds. Ass'n v. State Bd. 
ofEduc, 2001 UT 2, If 13, 17 P.3d 1125 (citation 
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omitted). Moreover, "[t]he plain language of a 
statute is to be read as a whole, and its provisions 
interpreted in harmony with other provisions in the 
same statute and with other statutes under the same 
and related chapters." Lyon v. Burton, 2000 UT 19, 
If 17, 5 P.3d 616 (internal quotations and citations 
omitted). 
f 16 In State v. Larsen, 578 P.2d 1280, 1281-82 
(Utah 1978), we held that a person could not be 
convicted of automobile homicide for causing the 
death of a twenty-six-week-old fetus because a fetus 
was not specifically recognized in statute as a 
human being. In response to our decision, the 
legislature amended the criminal homicide statute 
[FN4] to provide that a person is guilty of criminal 
homicide if, acting with the requisite mental state, 
the person "causes the death of another human 
being, including an unborn child." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-201(l)(a) (1999). By its plain meaning the 
statute recognizes that an unborn child is a human 
being. 
FN4. The criminal homicide statute is 
statutorily linked to the automobile 
homicide statute, which sets forth the 
conditions under which criminal homicide 
constitutes the specific crime of 
automobile homicide. Utah Code Ann. § 
76-5-207(l)(a),(2)(a)(1999). 
\ 17 Defendant contends nevertheless that the 
statute is unconstitutionally vague because "it is 
impossible to ascertain from statute, or otherwise, 
when unborn childhood begins." As a result, he 
argues, an ordinary person is left to guess whether 
his or her conduct falls within the parameters of the 
statute because it is unknown at what point a 
potential life actually becomes an unborn child. 
\ 18 Although the defendant attempts "to inject 
doubt as to the meaning of words where no doubt 
would be felt by the normal reader," such straining 
"is not required by the 'void for vagueness' doctrine, 
and we will not indulge in it" here. United States v. 
Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 93, 96 S.Ct. 316, 46 L.Ed.2d 
228 (1975). Instead, we will attribute to the 
legislature the commonsense meaning of the term 
"unborn child." Id. 
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«[f 19 "Unborn child" is defined as "[t]he 
individual human life in existence and developing 
prior to birth." Black's Law Dictionary 1058 
(abridged 6th ed.1991). See also 
Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 1285 
(10th ed.1998) (defining "unborn" as "not born," 
"not brought into life," or "existing without birth"). 
Therefore, without modifying language to the 
contrary, the commonsense meaning of the term 
"unborn child" is a human being at any stage of 
development in utero because once fertilization 
occurs, an unborn child is an "individual human 
life" that is "in existence and developing prior to 
birth." 
2. Definition of "Unborn Child" in Other Chapters 
of the Utah Criminal Code and in Other Jurisdictions 
f 20 This definition is consistent with how the 
term "unborn child" is used in other parts of the 
criminal code. For example, in a chapter of the 
criminal code that regulates abortions, the 
legislature mandates that informational materials be 
made available to any person contemplating an 
abortion. Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-305.5(1) (1999). 
The informational materials must include "the 
probable anatomical and physiological 
characteristics of the unborn child at two-week 
gestational increments from fertilization to full term, 
accompanied by pictures or video segments 
representing the development of an unborn child at 
those gestational increments." Id. § 
76-7-305.5(l)(b) (emphasis added). 
If 21 Additionally, the legislature mandates that 
the Utah Department of Health produce a videotape 
"showfing] an ultrasound of the *1176 heart beat of 
an unborn child at three weeks gestational age, at 
six to eight weeks gestational age, and each month 
thereafter, until 14 weeks gestational age.u Id. § 
76- 7-305.5(4) (emphasis added). Thus, when the 
plain language of the criminal homicide statute is 
read in harmony with other chapters of the criminal 
code, it is clear that the legislature intended the term 
"unborn child" to encompass the period from 
fertilization to birth. 
Tf 22 Finally, case law from other jurisdictions 
recognizes that "[t]here is no unconstitutional 
vagueness in the description of the unborn as the 
'unborn child.' " Brinkley v. Georgia, 253 Ga. 541, 
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322 S.E.2d 49, 53 (1984) (affirming convictions of 
co-defendants for violation of Georgia's feticide 
statute). Specifically, the Georgia Supreme Court 
noted that the term "unborn child" in Georgia's 
feticide statute would have "clearly cover[ed] the 
entire period of pregnancy" if the legislature had not 
limited it to the period where an unborn child is "so 
far developed as to be ordinarily called 'quick.' " Id. 
at 51, 53 (quoting Ga.Code Ann. § 16-5-80 (1982)). 
The court's conclusion that the state's feticide 
statute was not unconstitutionally vague was later 
followed by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. 
Smith v. Newsome, 815 F.2d 1386, 1387-88 (11th 
Cir.1987). 
3. The Recent Amendment to the Criminal 
Homicide Statute Does Not Demonstrate that the 
Term "Unborn Child" Is Unconstitutionally Vague 
f^ 23 Defendant also contends that the legislature's 
recent amendment to the statute demonstrates "in 
and of itself that the term "unborn child" is 
unconstitutionally vague. Effective May 6, 2002, 
the legislature inserted "at any stage of its 
development" after the term "unborn child." Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-201(l)(a) (Supp.2003). Hence, 
the statute now reads that "[a] person commits 
criminal homicide if he ... causes the death of 
another human being, including an unborn child at 
any stage of its development." Id. (emphasis added). 
If 24 Although we acknowledge that the statute is 
now more precise, this does not mean that the 
statute prior to amendment was unconstitutionally 
vague. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has 
stated that "[t]he fact that Congress might, without 
difficulty, have chosen '[cjlearer and more precise 
language' equally capable of achieving the end 
which it sought does not mean that the statute which 
it in fact drafted is unconstitutionally vague." 
United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 94, 96 S.Ct. 
316, 46 L.Ed.2d 228 (1975) (quoting United States 
v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7, 67 S.Ct. 1538, 91 L.Ed. 
1877 (1947)). Here, the legislature drafted a statute 
that achieved the end that it sought, namely, to 
include an unborn child within the definition of a 
human being for purposes of the criminal homicide 
statute. While adding the phrase "at any stage of its 
development" made the statute more precise, it did 
not alter the commonsense meaning of "unborn 
child." We therefore conclude that the term 
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"unborn child" provides the kind of notice that 
enables ordinary people to understand what conduct 
is statutorily prohibited. 
4. The Term "Unborn Child" Does Not Render the 
Aggravated Murder Statute Unconstitutionally 
Vague 
If 25 Finally, defendant contends that because the 
term "unborn child" fails to provide adequate notice 
concerning what conduct is proscribed, it renders 
the aggravated murder statute unconstitutionally 
vague. We disagree. 
If 26 The criminal homicide statute expressly 
includes an unborn child within its definition of a 
human being. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-201(l)(a) 
(1999). This definition of a human being is 
imported into the aggravated murder statute because 
of the statutory link between the criminal homicide 
statute and the aggravated murder statute. 
If 27 Specifically, the aggravated murder statute 
provides that [c]riminal homicide constitutes 
aggravated murder if the actor intentionally or 
knowingly causes the death of another " under any 
one of seventeen circumstances, including killing 
two or more persons during the same criminal 
episode. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(l)(b) (1999) 
(emphasis added). 
*1177 1f 28 Defendant argues that because the 
term "unborn child" is not defined in the criminal 
homicide statute, it also renders the terms "another" 
and "persons" in the aggravated murder statute 
unconstitutionally vague because it is impossible to 
know when an unborn child achieves the status of a 
human being. Because we have already concluded, 
however, that the term "unborn child" provides the 
kind of notice that enables ordinary people to 
understand what conduct is statutorily prohibited, 
the term cannot render the words "another" and 
"persons" unconstitutionally vague. We now turn to 
a discussion of defendant's second argument; 
namely, that the criminal homicide statute 
encourages arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement. 
C. Defining Conduct Sufficiently to Preclude 
Arbitrary and Discriminatory 
Enforcement 
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[14] f 29 In addition to providing adequate notice 
about what conduct is proscribed, the "void for 
vagueness" doctrine requires the legislature to 
"define the criminal offense ... in a manner that does 
not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement." Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 
357, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983) 
(citations omitted). In other words, the legislature 
must " 'establish minimal guidelines to govern law 
enforcement.' " Id. at 358, 103 S.Ct. 1855 (quoting 
Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574, 94 S.Ct. 1242, 
39L.Ed.2d605(1974)). 
If 30 Here, defendant contends that "[t]he 
Legislature's failure to clearly and specifically 
define the term 'unborn child' not only encourages 
but facilitates arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement" because "the prosecutor is left to 
speculate at what point an unborn child becomes a 
person for enforcement purposes." Additionally, 
defendant contends that enforcement decisions will 
be made "at least in part, by the prosecutor's own 
thoughts or beliefs concerning fetal rights," because 
the statute fails to provide adequate guidance. 
[15] If 31 This argument fails for the same reason 
that defendant's argument concerning adequacy of 
notice fails. Defendant's argument is premised on 
the notion that the legislature had to define the term 
"unborn child" in order for the term to have a 
definite meaning. The "void for vagueness" 
doctrine does not, however, require a legislature to 
define terms that are readily ascertainable. Because 
the term "unborn child" has a straightforward 
definition, as we have discussed above, a prosecutor 
is not left to speculate as to the statute's meaning. 
Thus, the legislature adequately established minimal 
guidelines for the enforcement of the statute. We 
therefore conclude that the statute is not 
unconstitutionally vague either facially or as 
applied because it does not encourage or facilitate 
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. 
\ 32 In sum, we conclude that the term "unborn 
child" is not unconstitutionally vague because, 
absent modifying language to the contrary, it clearly 
encompasses a human being at any stage of 
development in utero. The statute thus provides 
adequate notice to an ordinary person about what 
conduct is proscribed. Moreover, because the 
meaning of the term is readily ascertainable, its 
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inclusion does not encourage or facilitate arbitrary 
and discriminatory enforcement. Hence, the 
criminal homicide and aggravated murder statutes 
are sufficiently clear as applied to the defendant and 
cannot be considered "impermissibly vague in all 
[their] applications." Indeed, given our plain, 
commonsense reading of the term "unborn child," it 
is difficult to imagine any circumstance in which the 
meaning would be unclear. Thus, defendant's 
vagueness challenges fail, both facially and as 
applied, and we affirm the decision of the district 
court on this issue. 
III. EQUAL PROTECTION 
[16] f^ 33 In addition to challenging the criminal 
homicide and aggravated murder statutes for 
vagueness, defendant contends the statutes violate 
equal protection guarantees under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
article 1, section 24 of the Utah Constitution. 
Specifically, defendant contends that because 
physicians are not prosecuted for aborting fetuses 
and microbiologists are not prosecuted for *1178 
destroying fertilized embryos for stem cell research, 
the statute "does not apply equally to all persons 
within the class," namely, those who cause the death 
of an unborn child. Hence, according to defendant, 
the statute is unconstitutional. 
TI 34 The State argues that we should not address 
defendant's argument because he did not raise it 
before the district court. Although we note that 
defendant did make reference to equal protection 
guarantees in his motion to dismiss, we need not 
address whether such references were sufficient to 
preserve this issue for appeal because defendant 
failed to petition for interlocutory review of the 
issue. 
«f 35 Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure specifies that "[a]n appeal from an 
interlocutory order may be sought ... by filing a 
petition for permission to appeal from the 
interlocutory order." Utah R.App. P. 5(a) 
(emphasis added). The petition must contain "[t]he 
issue presented" and a "concise analysis of the 
statutes, rules[,] or cases believed to be 
determinative of the issue stated." Id, at 
5(c)(l)(B)-(C). 
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f 36 Here, defendant's petition for interlocutory 
appeal did not address the equal protection issue. 
We therefore did not grant permission for defendant 
to appeal this issue. Moreover, because the petition 
made no reference to the equal protection argument, 
and did not provide a concise analysis of the legal 
authority, the State was denied the opportunity to 
respond to this issue in its Opposition to Petition for 
Permission to Appeal from Interlocutory Order. 
We therefore decline to address defendant's equal 
protection argument. 
CONCLUSION 
f^ 37 In summary, the term "unborn child" does 
not render Utah's criminal homicide and aggravated 
murder statutes unconstitutionally vague. The 
criminal homicide statute provides that a person 
may be prosecuted for causing the death of a human 
being, including an unborn child. Because the 
commonsense meaning of the term "unborn child" 
is a human being at any stage of development in 
utero, the term provides sufficient notice to an 
ordinary person about what conduct is proscribed. 
Moreover, the term does not encourage arbitrary 
and discriminatory enforcement because its 
meaning is readily ascertainable. Consequently, we 
conclude that the term "unborn child" does not 
render the criminal homicide statute 
unconstitutionally vague. We also conclude that the 
terms "another" and "persons" are not rendered 
unconstitutionally vague in the aggravated murder 
statute by the fact that they encompass the term 
"unborn child." We therefore affirm the district 
court on this issue. 
\ 38 We decline to address defendant's equal 
protection argument. Although there is some 
question concerning whether defendant adequately 
raised this issue below, we need not determine 
whether the issue was adequately preserved because 
defendant did not petition for interlocutory review 
of his equal protection argument. As a result, we 
did not grant permission to defendant to appeal this 
issue and we decline to address it. 
^ 39 The district court's decision to deny 
defendant's motion to dismiss is affirmed. 
K 40 Justice WELKINS, Justice PARRISH, and 
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Judge NEHRING concur in Associate Chief Judge 
DURRANT's opinion. 
PARRISH, Justice, concurring: 
% 41 I join in both the reasoning and the holding 
of Associate Chief Justice Durrant's lead opinion. I 
write separately to address the issue raised by the 
dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Durham. 
K 42 The Chief Justice agrees with the lead 
opinion's conclusion that the criminal homicide 
statute permissibly defines killing an "unborn child" 
as a homicide, but dissents with respect to whether 
the defendant may be prosecuted for aggravated 
murder. The dissent is predicated on the notion that 
a fetus is not a full legal "person" under the laws of 
the United States or the laws of Utah. Accordingly, 
because the aggravated murder statute, Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-202 (1999), provides that homicide is 
aggravated murder if committed incident to a 
scheme or course of conduct during which two or 
more "persons" are killed, the dissent concludes 
*1179 that the defendant may not be prosecuted for 
aggravated murder. 
1f 43 I disagree with the conclusion urged by the 
dissent for two reasons. First, when read in context, 
the term "person" as used in the aggravated murder 
statute is clearly intended to include an unborn 
child, and I do not believe this presents a 
constitutional problem because it does not infringe 
on any constitutionally protected rights. Second, 
the defendant would nevertheless be subject to 
prosecution for aggravated murder under a 
provision of the aggravated murder statute not 
addressed in the dissent. 
If 44 The dissent is based on the premise that the 
word "person" in the aggravated murder statute was 
intended by the legislature to constitute a term of art 
with a meaning independent of the statutory scheme 
as a whole. In my view, however, the term "person" 
as used in the aggravated murder statute, constitutes 
only a generic reference back to the statutory 
provision defining the elements of criminal 
homicide, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-201. In that 
section, the legislature unmistakably provided that 
causing the death of a human being, including an 
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unborn child, constitutes homicide. The following 
section builds upon the criminal homicide statute by 
designating the circumstances under which 
"criminal homicide" constitutes "aggravated 
murder." Accordingly, when considered in context, 
it is clear that the term "person" in the aggravated 
murder statute must be interpreted to include an 
unborn child. [FN 1] 
FN1. The dissent points out that, in a 
variety of contexts, the term "person" has 
been interpreted not to include a fetus or 
unborn child. While this is true, there is 
nothing that requires the term "person" in 
one context to be interpreted 
co-extensively with the term "person" 
when used in an entirely different context. 
In light of the clearly expressed legislative 
intent, I see no constitutional impediment 
to interpreting the term "person" to include 
an "unborn child" in the context of this 
particular statutory provision. 
f 45 Interpreting the term "person" in light of the 
statutory context and clearly expressed legislative 
intent is consistent with long-established principles 
of statutory construction. " 'One of the cardinal 
principles of statutory construction is that the courts 
will look to the reason, spirit, and sense of the 
legislation, as indicated by the entire context and 
subject matter of the statute dealing with the 
subject.' " Mountain States Tel. & Tel Co. v. Payne, 
782 P.2d 464, 466 (Utah 1989) (quoting Masich v. 
U.S. Smelting, 113 Utah 101, 191 P.2d 612, 616 
(1948)). Indeed, the dissent's singular focus on the 
word "person" as a term of art is inconsistent with 
the fundamental principle that words are to be 
determined in light of their association with 
surrounding words and phrases and in harmony with 
other statutes in the same chapter. Miller v. Weaver, 
2003 UT 12, \ 17, 66 P.3d 592. 
U 46 For similar reasons, I am not persuaded by 
the dissent's concern that interpreting the term 
"person" to include an unborn child would raise 
federal constitutional issues. The dissent implies 
that any statute that defines the term "person" to 
include an "unborn child" would necessarily run 
afoul of the federal Constitution, without regard to 
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the context in which that definition occurs or the 
consequences that flow from that definition. I do 
not agree with this principle. 
f 47 Our interpretation of the term "person" in the 
context of the particular statutory scheme before the 
court neither implies that the rights of a fetus are 
equivalent to those of a person for purposes of 
federal constitutional analysis nor mandates the 
conclusion that the term "person" is used in an 
unconstitutional manner. I believe the legislature's 
use of the word "person" to refer to a fetus would 
create a clear constitutional issue only if it carried 
with it a restriction of a constitutionally protected 
right, such as in the context of a statute restricting a 
woman's right to terminate her pregnancy. An 
entirely different context is presented where, as 
here, a third party is accused of attacking and 
killing a fetus against the will of the mother. See 
State v. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d 318, 321-22 
(Minn. 1990) (holding that a fetal homicide statute 
does not impinge directly or indirectly on a 
pregnant woman's privacy rights); 66 Fed. Credit 
Union v. Tucker, 853 So.2d 104, 113-14 
(Miss.2003) (holding that a wrongful death statute 
protects a fetus, and that the rights of a mother as 
outlined in *1180/toe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 
S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973), have no relation 
to the rights of a defendant accused of causing the 
death of a fetus); People v. Ford, 221 Ill.App.3d 
354, 163 Ill.Dec. 766, 581 N.E.2d 1189, 1199 
(1991) (holding that a pregnant woman who 
chooses to terminate her pregnancy and a defendant 
who assaults a pregnant woman, causing the death 
of her fetus, are not similarly situated). This 
statute's use of the term "person" to refer to a fetal 
victim defines the crime of aggravated murder. It 
does not declare a fetus to be a person entitled to 
equal protection, nor does it restrict a woman's right 
to obtain an abortion. In fact, there is no possibility 
that the statute in question could undermine a 
woman's right to obtain an abortion under the 
federal Constitution because the statute specifically 
provides that there "shall be no cause of action for 
criminal homicide for the death of an unborn child 
caused by an abortion." Utah Code Ann. § 
76-5-201(l)(b) (1999 & Supp.2003). 
f 48 I am unpersuaded by the dissent's conclusion 
that the defendant should not be subject to 
prosecution for aggravated murder for an 
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independent reason as well. The dissent focuses on 
the portion of subsection (l)(b) of the aggravated 
murder statute that refers to homicides committed 
incident to one act, scheme, or course of conduct in 
which "two or more persons were killed." Utah 
Code Arm. § 76-5-202(l)(b) (1999). However, 
even if we were to assume that the defendant could 
not be prosecuted under that portion of subsection 
(l)(b), it is my view that the defendant would be 
subject to prosecution under the second clause of 
that same subsection. Subsection (l)(b) reads in its 
entirety: 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes aggravated 
murder if the actor intentionally or knowingly 
causes the death of another under any of the 
following circumstances: 
(b) the homicide was committed incident to one 
act, scheme, course of conduct, or criminal 
episode during which two or more persons were 
killed or during which the actor attempted to kill 
one or more persons in addition to the victim 
who was killed [.] 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 (1999) (emphasis 
added). In this case, the defendant has been 
charged with the criminal homicide of an unborn 
child pursuant to section 76-5-201. When the 
unborn child is understood to be the "victim" of the 
homicide, that unborn child was killed during an 
alleged criminal episode in which the defendant 
allegedly attempted to kill one or more persons, in 
this case Susan MacGuire, in addition to the unborn 
victim. Accordingly, the defendant may be tried for 
aggravated murder under section 76-5-202(l)(b). 
[FN2] 
FN2. The fact that subsection (l)(b) uses 
the terms "victim" and "person" in a 
seemingly interchangeable manner bolsters 
my conclusion that the term "person" as 
used in that subsection was not intended by 
the legislature to constitute a term of art, 
but rather a generic reference to a human 
being, including an unborn child, as used 
in the criminal homicide statute, Utah 
Code Ann. §76-5-201. 
\ 49 I believe that the statutory provisions 
addressing aggravated murder must be interpreted 
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in the context of the statutory framework as a 
whole. Accordingly, I have no difficulty concluding 
that the term "person" as used in the aggravated 
murder statute includes an unborn child. I therefore 
concur in Associate Chief Justice Durrant's 
conclusion that the defendant may appropriately be 
prosecuted for aggravated murder. 
1f 50 Associate Chief Justice DURRANT, Justice 
WILKINS, and Judge NEHRING concur in Justice 
PARRISH's concurring opinion. 
If 51 Justice RUSSON did not participate herein; 
then District Judge NEHRING sat. 
DURHAM, Chief Justice, dissenting: 
K 52 I respectfully dissent. Defendant is charged 
with shooting and killing his pregnant ex-wife and 
her fetus. While these acts constitute two 
homicides within the meaning of section 76-5-201, 
a charge of aggravated murder based on the killing 
of Ms. MacGuire and her fetus cannot be sustained 
as the killing of two "persons" under Utah Code 
section 76-5-202(l)(b). 
L Section 76-5-201 
\ 53 Pursuant to the language of section 
76-5-201(1), "causfing] the death of another *1181 
human being, including an unborn child" is 
homicide, except that if the death is caused by 
abortion it is not homicide. Utah Code Ann. § 
76-5-201(1) (1999). Defendant contends that this 
provision is unconstitutionally vague. I agree with 
the majority that the statutory language is not so 
unclear as to violate minimal constitutional 
requirements. 
\ 54 The term "unborn child" is not defined in the 
statute and is not entirely clear in ordinary or legal 
usage. In our society, the moral status of the fetus 
is highly controversial. For many, a fetus, 
especially in the early stages of pregnancy, exists in 
a liminal state, somewhere between folly human and 
not human. Our fellow citizens disagree radically 
over when in this period of developing life an egg 
and sperm combined have matured enough to 
warrant moral or legal consideration as a person or 
a full human being. 
\ 55 Some Americans, attempting to make sense 
of the difficult issues surrounding family 
responsibility and abortion, reserve the word 
"child" for infants who have been born, or begin to 
refer to a fetus as a "child" only at the point at 
which they believe there is a reasonable likelihood 
that it will be born. Thus, for example, one 
commentator contends that in the view of many 
Americans, "child" refers to a member of the 
family. See Daniel JH Greenwood, Beyond 
Dworkin's Dominions: Investments, Memberships, 
the Tree of Life, and the Abortion Question, 72 Tex. 
L.Rev. 471 (1994) (disputing Professor Dworkin's 
view that no one believes that a fetus is a moral 
"person" and arguing instead that a wide variety of 
religious and secular observers see the fetus as 
developing into a "person" and becoming entitled to 
more rights and consideration over time, while 
others see varying moments, ranging from the sex 
act to birth, when those rights attach). Families 
have a period of time after pregnancy has begun in 
which they still may legally reject the responsibility 
of raising a child-something that is morally 
impermissible once they accept the developing fetus 
as a child. In that usage, an "unborn child" would 
refer only to a wanted pregnancy sufficiently far 
developed to be likely to come to term. To apply 
Utah's statute from that perspective, a prosecutor 
would be required to prove that the mother had, in 
fact, decided not to abort and that the pregnancy 
was reasonably likely to come to term. Hence the 
moral ambiguity of the term "unborn child" in the 
statute. 
f 56 A statute that used the word "fetus" rather 
than "unborn child" would be clearer and more 
respectful of the diversity of opinion in our society. 
Nonetheless, the legislature is entitled to use 
polemical and political language, even on highly 
controversial issues, so long as the language gives 
clear notice of what is intended to be criminalized. 
The word "child" clearly includes the unborn in 
such ancient phrases as "quick with child"; indeed, 
the Oxford English Dictionary reports that it 
appears to be descended from a word specifically 
referring to the womb rather than an infant. The 
modern usage of "unborn child," I believe, reflects 
less an attempt (like Professor Greenwood's) to 
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make sense of how so many Americans can support 
legal abortion while also believing that mothers 
have a duty to care for their children even 
pre-natally, than the desire of those who oppose 
abortion to find new linguistic opportunities to 
emphasize respect for the fetus. In the context of 
this case, I agree with the majority that it is 
sufficiently clear that the legislature meant to 
classify the killing of every fetus as a homicide and 
that ordinary citizens will understand that intent. 
Section 76-5-201 therefore passes "void for 
vagueness" muster. 
//. Section 76-5-202(l)(b) 
1f 57 Section 76-5-202(1 )(b), however, is a 
different matter. It provides that homicide is 
aggravated murder if "the homicide was committed 
incident to one act, scheme, course of conduct, or 
criminal episode during which two or more persons 
were killed." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1 )(b) 
(1999) (emphasis added). As discussed below, a 
fetus is not a full legal "person" and cannot be so 
constituted under the law of the United States or 
Utah. The plain meaning of section 76-5-202(1 )(b) 
is that killing a mother and her fetus cannot 
constitute aggravated homicide. 
f 58 Preliminarily, it is clear that the legislature is 
entitled to protect to the fullest *1182 extent 
pregnant mothers and their expectations of bringing 
their pregnancies to term. Even supporters of legal 
abortion agree that an assault which destroys a 
developing fetus is a particularly heinous crime. 
See, e.g., Beyond Dworkin's Dominions, supra, at 
489. A violent attack by a third person on a mother 
that also kills her fetus injures more than the mother 
alone. One of the most fundamental of life's 
experiences has been cut short; parents' aspirations 
to bring forth a new generation have been shattered; 
a family that could have been will not be; a life 
that could have developed into an independent 
individual has been extinguished. We need not 
enter into any debate regarding the status of the 
fetus itself to see that a state may freely increase 
penalties for a homicide or an assault that also kills 
a fetus: respect for the mother alone would be 
sufficient. The power of the legislature to classify a 
homicide that also unlawfully destroys a fetus as 
aggravated murder, then, is not at issue here. The 
problem is, rather, that the legislature has not 
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clearly done so. The aggravated homicide statute 
applies when two "persons" are killed, and a fetus is 
not a person under our law. 
f 59 "Person" is a legal category with important 
consequences. Most important, persons are entitled 
to rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution. It would be an obvious 
denial of equal protection to allow doctors, or 
anyone else, to kill one "person" in order to save 
another, and clearly a denial of due process to 
permit this without any legal process at all. Thus, 
declaring a fetus to be a "person" entitled to equal 
protection would require not only overturning Roe 
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 
147 (1973), but also making abortion, as a matter of 
constitutional law, illegal in all circumstances, even 
to save the life of the mother. [FN1] Utah law 
reflects this principle. The legislature has stated 
that "a woman's liberty interest, in limited 
circumstances, may outweigh the unborn child's 
right to protection," and has specified when 
abortion is warranted. Utah Code Ann. § 
76-7-301.1(4) (1999). A fortiori, if a fetus were 
deemed a legal "person," its life could not be taken 
intentionally in the process of honoring a pregnant 
woman's "liberty interest." Roe, 410 U.S. at 157 n. 
54, 93 S.Ct. 705 n. 54. 
FN1. The due process and equal protection 
clauses state, in relevant part, "nor shall 
any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty or property, without due process of 
law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws." U.S. Const, amend. XIV, cl. 1 
(emphasis added). 
f 60 For these reasons, as Justice Stevens has 
stated, 
[N]o member of the Court has ever questioned 
this fundamental proposition [i.e., that a fetus is 
not a "person"]. Thus as a matter of federal 
constitutional law, a developing organism that is 
not yet a "person" does not have what is 
sometimes described as a "right to life." This has 
been and ... remains a fundamental premise of our 
constitutional law.... 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 
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674 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). END OF DOCUMENT 
If 61 To declare a fetus a "person" is beyond the 
power of the state of Utah, whether acting through 
either its legislature or its courts. A state cannot 
overrule the United States Supreme Court by 
changing who counts as a "person" for 
constitutional purposes. Justice Stevens, quoting 
Professor Dworkin, put it this way: 
The suggestion that states are free to declare a 
fetus a person ... assumes that a state can curtail 
some [existing] persons' constitutional rights by 
adding new persons to the constitutional 
population. The constitutional rights of one 
citizen are of course very much affected by who 
or what else has constitutional rights, because the 
rights of others may compete or conflict with his. 
So any power to increase the constitutional 
population by unilateral decision would be, in 
effect, a power to decrease the rights the national 
Constitution grants to others. 
Id at 913 n. 2, 112 S.Ct. 2791 n. 2 (quoting 
Ronald Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights: Whether 
and How Roe Should be Overruled, 59 U. Chi. 
L.Rev. 381,400-01(1992)). 
*1183 If 62 Finally, even if the Utah Legislature 
could define "person" to include a fetus, which I 
believe it cannot, the legislature does not seem to 
have done so. At any rate, no statutory language 
defining "person," as opposed to "unborn child" or 
"human being" has been cited to us. 
Tf 63 If a fetus is not a "person" in the language of 
the law, it follows that the defendant in this case, 
heinous as his crime is, has not committed 
aggravated murder within the meaning of Utah 
Code section 76-5- 202(1 )(b). That provision 
applies only when "two or more persons were 
killed." In the case at hand, two lives were 
extinguished: that of Ms. MacGuire and that of the 
fetus she was carrying. Under Utah law, these two 
killings may each be prosecuted as separate 
homicides, but only one "person" was killed. 
Defendant cannot be prosecuted for killing two or 
more "persons," when only one of his victims was a 
"person." I do not believe defendant can be tried 
for aggravated murder under section 76-5-202(1 )(b). 
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